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NEW EVIDENCE AND NEW RESULTS
Erik Brynjolfsson
Lorin Hitt
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
The "productivity paradox" of information systems (IS) is that despite enormous improvements in the
underlying technology, the benefits of IS spending have not been found in aggregate output statistics. One
explanation is that IS spending may lead to increases in product quality or variety which tend to be
overlooked in aggregate output statistics, even if they increase sales at the firm level. Furthermore, Lhe
restructuring and cost-cutting that are often necessary to realize these potential benefits have only recently
been undertaken in many firms.
Our study uses new firm-level data on several components of IS spending for the period 1987 to 1991.
The dataset includes 380 large firms which generated approximately two trillion dollars in output annually.
We supplemented the IS data with data on other inputs, output, and price deflators from several other
sources. As a result, we could assess several econometric models of the contribution of IS to firm-level
productivity.
Our results indicate that IS have made a substantial and statistically significant contribution to firm output.
We find that between 1987 and 1991, return on investment (ROD for computer capital averaged 54% in
manufacturing and 68% for manufacturing and services combined in our sample. We am able to reject
the null hypothesis that the ROI for computer capital is no greater than the return to other types of capital
investment and also find that IS labor spending generates several times as much output as spending on
non-IS labor and expenses. Because the models we applied were essentially the same as those that have
been previously used to assess the contribution of IT and other factors of production, we attribute the
different results to the recency and larger size of our dataset. We conclude that the "productivity
paradox" disappeared by 1991, at least in our sample of firms.
1. INTRODUCTION because none of the previous estimates of IT productivity
were based on data for the past five years, this hypothesis
Spending on information systems (IS), and in particular remains untested.
information technology (IT) capital, is widely regarded as
having enormous potential for reducing costs and enhancing This study considers new evidence and finds sharply
the competitiveness of American firms. Although spending different results from previous studies. Our dataset is based
has surged in the past decade (Figure 1), there is surpris- on five annual surveys of several hundred large firms for a
ingly little formal evidence linking it to higher productivity. total of 1,164 observations.' The firms in our sample
Several studies, such as those by Loveman (1988) and by generated approximately two trillion dollars worth of output
Bania, Kriebel and Mukhopadhyay (1991) have been unable in the United States annually. Out-of-sample extrapolations
to reject the hypothesis that computers add nothing at all to will not be necessary to derive conclusions broadly relevant
total output. Roach (1987), who was among the first to to the US economy because of the large number and size of
identify the productivity shortfall in the 1980s, is more the firms in our dataset. Because the identity of each of
optimistic about the current prospects for productivity the participating firms is known, we were able to supple-
growth because many firms have finally begun to realize ment and cross-check this data with data from several other
the potential labor savings enabled by IT. However, sources. As a result, we could assess several econometric
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Figure 1. Changes in Outputs and Inputs Over Time
models of the contribution of IS to firm-level productivity. 1.1 Previous Research on ]T and Productivity
Furthermore, because we have data through 1991, our
results are relevant to the proposition that computer invest- Although previous work provides little econometric evi-
ment is finally beginning to create measurable value. dence that computers improve productivity, Brynjolfsson
(1993) reviews the literature on this "productivity para-
Our examination of this data indicates that IS have made a dox" and concludes that the "shortfall of evidence is not
substantial and statistically significant contribution to the necessarily evidence of a shortfall." He notes that in-
output of firms. Our point estimates indicate that, dollar creases in product variety and quality should properly be
for dollar, spending on computer capital created more value counted as part of the value of output, but that current
than spending on other types of capital and spending on IS output and productivity statistics do not properly reflect this
labor created more value than spending on other non-capital value. In addition, with any new technology, a period of
expenses. We find that the contribution of IS to output learning, adjustment and restructuring may be necessary to
does not vary much across years, although there is weak reap its full benefits. Accordingly, he argues that "mis-
evidence of an increase over time. We also find some measurement" and "lags" are two of four viable explana-
evidence of differences across different sectors of the tions (along with "redistribution" and "mismanagement")
economy. For the firms in our sample, we estimate that the for the collected findings of earlier studies, which leaves
return on investment for computers to be over 50% annual- the question of computer productivity open to continuing
ly (see Figure 2). Considering a 95% confidence interval debate.
around our estimates, we can reject the hypothesis that
computers add nothing to total output. Furthermore, Despite the measurement problems with industry-level
several of our regressions suggest that the return on invest- output statistics, they have historically been the only data
ments for computers is significantly higher than the return that are available for a broad cross-section of the economy.
on investment for other types of capital. Our findings Morrison and Berndt (1990) examined industry-level data
suggest that if there ever was a "productivity paradox," it using a production function that controlled for changes in
disappeared in the 1987-1991 period, at least for our other inputs and found that each dollar spent on "high
sample of large firms. tech" capital increased measured output by only 80 cents
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Figure 2. Summary of Results: Return to Computer Capital versus Other Capital
on the margin. In a related study using much of the same whole do not necessarily increase, so data on aggregate
data, Berndt and Morrison (1992) conclude "there is a industry revenues could be misleading.
statistically significant negative relationship between pro-
ductivity growth and the high-tech intensity of the capital." On the other hand, a weakness of firm-level data is that it
However, they also point out: "it is possible that the can be painstaking to collect and therefore studies with
negative productivity results are due to measurement firm-level data have historically focused on relatively
problems." narrow samples. Therefore, it has been difficult to draw
generalizable results from these studies. For instance, Weill
One way to mitigate the measurement problems inherent in (1992) found some positive impacts for investments in
industry-level data is to use firm-level data instead. For transactional IS but not for overall IS spending. However,
example, if consumers value a benefit such as variety, then the thirty-three strategic business units in his sample from
they are likely to sh(# their purchases away from firms the valve manufacturing industry accounted for less than $2
offering only mass-produced products toward firms offering billion in total sales, and he notes, "the findings of the
more customized products. Because the cost per unit at the study have limited external validity." Using different
customizing firm may be higher, it may appear to have data,3 Loveman (1988) concluded "Investments in [T
lower productivity by conventional measures if similar showed no net contribution to total output," and Barua,
products are compared. However, the increased sales by Kriebel and Mukhopadhyay (1992) found that computer
the customizing firm would indicate that they are adding investments are not significantly correlated with increases
real value to their products. Note that while the benefits of in return on assets. However, both of these studies derived
spending (and the costs of not spending) would show up as only fairly imprecise estimates of IT's relationship to firm
increases in sales at the firm level, industry revenues as a performance. For instance, the 95% confidence interval
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exceeded f 300% for the ROI implied by the estimates in The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
Loveman. A more detailed discussion of these and other section 2, we describe the methodology and data of our
studies of IT productivity can be found in Brynjolfsson study. The results are presented in section 3. In section 4,
(1993). we conclude by discussing the implications of our results.
1.2 Approach of this Paper 2. METHODS AND DATA
The imprecision of previous estimates highlights an inher- 2.1 Theoretical Basis
ent difficulty with measuring IT productivity. The mismea-
surement problem is exacerbated by the fact that the value It is important that any statistical analysis be based soundly
created by intangibles may be an important part of the in theory, to reduce the potential for spurious correlatioti
benefits from computerization. We conducted several (Banker et al. 1993). We draw on standard production
interviews with managers which revealed that they focus on theory from economics: the output that a firm produces is
five principal rationales for investing in IT: labor savings, a function of the inputs it uses. In particular, we assume
improved quality, greater product variety, better customer that the firms in our sample produce a quantity of output
service, and faster response time. In principle, all of these (Q) via a production function (F), whose inputs are com-
benefits should be incorporated in the government price puter capital (C), non-computer capital (K), information
deflators that convert nominal sales to real output. In systems staff labor (S), and other labor and expenses (L).
practice, the value of many benefits of IT, other than labor In addition, we assume that other factors, such as the
savings, is not well captured in aggregate productivity or industry or business sector (i) in which the company
Output statistics: operates and year (0 in which the observation was made,
may affect the relationship between inputs and outputs.
Although "we see computers everywhere," they represent Thus, we can write:
on the order of 1 % of firms expenses in most historical
data sets. This makes it very difficult to distinguish the Q = F(C, K, S, L; i,t) (1)
contribution of information technology from random shocks
that affect productivity. As Simon (1984) has observed: Output and each of the input variables can be measured in
either physical units or dollars. The advantage of measur-
In the physical sciences, when errors of mea- ing in dollar terms is that results will then more closely
surement and other noise are found to be of reflect the ultimate objective of the firm (profits or reve-
the same order of magnitude as the phenome- nues less costs). In particular, we hypothesize that a
na under study the response is not to try to significant portion of the output from increased use of
squeeze more information out of the data by information systems will take the form of greater product
statistical means; it is instead to find tech- variety and quality. Measurement of output in dollars
niques for observing the phenomena at a instead of units produced will enable us to better value
higher level of resolution. The corresponding variety and quality. However, this approach requires that
strategy for economics is obvious: to secure we account for inflation and changing prices of different
new kinds of data at the micro level. inputs and outputs over time and in different industries.
This can be done by multiplying the nominal dollar value
A convincing assessment of IS productivity would ideally of each variable in each year by an associated "deflator"
employ a sample which included a large share of the to get the "real" dollar values. This is the approach we
economy (as in the Berndt and Morrison studies), but at a take. In particular, we have 1,164 observations of the real
level of detail that disaggregated inputs and outputs for dollar values for each of the above variables.
individual firms (as in Loveman 1988; Barua, Kriebel and
Mukhopadhyay 1991; Weill 1992). Furthermore, because Some companies will be more efficient than others at
the recent restructuring of many firms may have been converting inputs to outputs. The amount of output that
essential to realizing the benefits of IS spending, the data can be produced for a given unit of a given input is often
should be as current as possible. Lack of such detailed measured as the return on investment of the inpuL When
data has hampered previous efforts. While our paper examining differences in the returns of a factor across firms
applies essentially the same models as those used in earlier or time periods, it is important to control for the effects of
studies, we use new firm-level data which is more recent changes in the other inputs to production. One way to do
more detailed and includes more companies. We believe this is to assume that the production function, F, has some
this accounts for our sharply different results. general form, and then estimate the parameters of it. This
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approach has a basis in economic theory and has been ihe results section. However, in each case, equation 3 is
extensively applied empirically (Berndt 1991, pp. 449-460). the basis for our estimates.
In our analysis, we assume that the production function
conforms to the Cobb-Douglas specification, which in our
context yields the following equation. 2.3 Data Sources and Construction
Q = eF°Ch'KB'SB'LB' (2) This study employed a unique data set on IS spending by
large U.S. firms that was compiled by International Data
In this specification,  1 and  3 are the output elasticity of Group (IDG). The information was collected in a survey of
computer capital and information systems staff (IS labor), IS executives that has been conducted annually from 1987
respectively: Estimating these parameters will yield an to 1991. The survey is intended to cover the largest com-
estimate of the amount of additional output that can be panies in the U.S. and is derived from the Fortune 500
attributed lo information systems spending. manufacturers plus other large service companies such as
banks and utilities that are not included in the Fortune 500.6
These parameters may vary depending on the industry and In 1991, data for over 500 firms were collected. Of these,
time period examined, although it is common practice to 279 had matching data from Compustat and were used in
assume they are constant within the sample. By cons- our analysis. The firms in our sample had 1991 revenues
training the parameters across time it is possible to get of over $2.1 trillion (nearly half of US GDP) and repre-
more efficient estimates of the parameters at the expense of sented 48 industries as classified by 2-digit SIC code.
disregarding possible changes over time. In our analysis, Respondents are asked to provide the market value ofwe also examined models in which some parameters were central processors used by the firm in the U.S. (main-
allowed to vary across time or across different sectors of frames, minicomputers, and supercomputers), the total
the economy; however, our main results are based on the central IS budget, the percentage of the IS budget devotedconstrained regressions.
to labor expenses, and the number of PCs and terminals in
use. To our knowledge, this is the only available source of
IT spending data at the firm level for a broad cross section2.2 Econometric Estimation Procedure
of the U.S. economy.
Of course, when estimating an equation such as (2), the
The firm names in the IDG data set were then matched torelationship will not hold exactly for every observation.
There are other external and internal disturbances that affect Compustat, a database of historical financial statement
the relationship between inputs and outputs, but which are information, to obtain data on output, capital investment,
not captured in any dataset In addition, even the variables expenses, number of employees and industry classification.
for which we do have observations are likely to be mea-
sured with some error. Accordingly, when estimating the There is some discretion as to how the years are matched
parameters of the production function, we have included an between the survey and Compustat. The survey is com-
error term. By taking the natural logarithm of both sides of pleted at the end of the year for data on the following year.
equation (2) and including an error term, E, we can derive Since the figure we are primarily interested in is computer
an equation that can be estimated econometrically. capital stock and the survey is timed to be completed by
the beginning of the new fiscal year, we interpret the
Log Qi, - B° + B, Log Cit + B2 Log Kit survey data as a beginning of period value, which we then
+ 4 Log Sit + 4 Log 4, + E (3) match to the end of year data on Compustat (for the pre-
vious period). This also allows us to make maximum use
where of the survey data and is the same approach used by IDG
(11 = output of a firm in industry i in year t for their reports based on these data.
Cit = computer capital
Kit = non-computer capital The series for the value of non-computer capital stock was
Sit = information systems staff labor constructed using a standard procedure described in Berndi
41 - other labor and expenses (1991, pp. 227-232) using a fifteen year series of invest-
B is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and ment data and the Winfrey S-3 table (Bureau of Economic
Log denotes the natural logarithm Analysis 1987) with a ten year service life assumption.
This method was chosen for comparability to other research
Depending on the nature of the error term, E, different and is also the method currently used by the Bureau of
econometric procedures may be called for, as discussed in Economic Analysis (BEA).
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Table 1. Data Sources, Construction Procedures, and Deflators
Series Source Construction Procedure Deflator
Computer IDG Survey "Market Value of Central Processors" converted BEA Deflator for Computer
Capital to constant 1987 dollars Capital (Gorman 1992)
Non- Compustat Total Property, Plant and Equipment Investment GDP Implicit Deflator for
Computer converted to constant 1987 dollars and aggre- Fixed Investment (Bush 1992)
Capital gated to create capital stock. Computer capital
was subtracted from this result.
IS Labor IDG Survey Total IS Budget times percentage of IS Budget Index of Total Compensation
(by company) devoted to labor expense. Con- Cost (Private Sector) (Bush
verted to constant 1987 dollars. 1992)
Non-IS Labor Compustat Total Labor, Materials, and other non-interest Producer Price Index for Inter-
and Expenses expenses converted to constant 1987 dollars. IS mediate Materials, Supplies
labor was subtracted from this result. and Components (Bush 1992)
Output Compustat Total sales converted to constant 1987 dollars. Industry or sector level defla-
tors based on Gross Output
and Related Series by Indus-
try, BEA (1977-89) and the
PPI for Intermediate Materials
Supplies and Components
To construct the series for computer capital, we converted could result in an understatement of total IS spending
the current reported market value of central processors from which may vary across firms in the sample. Third, only
the IDG survey into constant 1987 dollars. Since the the labor component (IS labor) of the IS budget could be
survey reports current market value of the computer capital included to prevent double counting of capital expenditures.
stock, no further adjustment is needed. However, this figure is likely to be correlated with other IS
expenditures leading to an overstatement of the contribution
The series for IS labor, non-IS labor and expense and of IS labor in our estimates. Finally, the narrow definition
output were also converted to constant 1987 dollars using of computer capital (central processors) excludes PCs,
appropriate deflators - an aggregate deflator for each input which is a potentially significant omission. Overall. this
and an industry-specific deflator for output. The sources, would suggest that the figures for computer capital and IS
construction procedure, and deflator for each series is labor may be understated and subject to error.
described in Table 1. Summary statistics for the sample are
presented in Tables 2 and 3. The sample includes 1,164 These difficulties notwithstanding, the numbers agree with
observations spread across five years on 380 distinct a recent study published by CSC/[ndex (Quinn, Craumer
companies. and Weaver 1993) that reported average IS spending as a
There are a number of possible errors in the data either as percentage of sales to be about 1.5%. They are also
a result of the errors in source data or inaccuracies intro- broadly consistent with the values reported by Cartwright
duced by the data construction methods employed. First, (1986) for computer investment in the overall US economy.
the IDG data on IS spending are self-reported and therefore
the accuracy of the data depends on the diligence of the Errors are also introduced by the methods used to create
respondents; there is potential sample selection bias since capital stock from capital investment, and the use of aggre-
participation is voluntary, and some items require judge- gate input deflators. Given the short length of the salnple
ment, particularly the market value of computer capital. (five years) and the relatively low level of inflation in this
Second, the numbers only include the ce,:tral IS spending, period, the overall error contribution of these assumptions
which may exclude IS spending by other departments; this is likely to be small.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Sample Statistics 1991
Constant 1987 Dollars
Manufacturing & Manufacturing
Data item Full Sample Service Only
Output $2,103 Bn $1,905 Bn $1,426 Bn
Computer Capital $25.4 Bn $21.8 Bn $17.85 Bn '
Non-Computer Capital $1,491 Bn $1,222 Bn $995 Bn
IS Labor $14.8 Bn $12.3 Bn $9.76 Bn
Non-IS Labor & Expenses $1,647 Bn $1,520 Bn $1,115 Bn
Number of Companies 292 270 202
*This sample used for sector based analyses. It excludes SIC48 and Finance.
Table 3. Five-Year Average Factor Shares and Correlation Matrix
Five Year Average Factor Shares
Percent of Output in Constant 1987 Dollars
Manufacturing & Manufacturing
Factor Full Sample Services* Only
Computer Capital 0.987% 0.890% 0.956%
Non-Computer Capital 69.8% 63.5% 69.1%
IS Labor 0.726% 0.677% 0.721%
Non-IS Labor & Expenses 80.3% 81.8% 80.7%
Number of Firms in Sample 1164 1055 788
*This sample used for sector based analyses.
A more serious problem is the difficulty in deflating indus- output, we consider firm level data to be the best way to
try output. It has been argued (Baily and Gordon 1988; assess the contribution of IT. We may still miss some of
Siegel and Griliches 1991) that the government methods the benefits of IT, but the estimates should be better than
fail to properly account for variety and quality change those relying on more aggregate data.
(particularly in service industries), which leads to an over-
statement of the rate of price inflation and an understate- In the full sample, we excluded firms in SIC48 (telecom-
ment of output. The ideal would be to have acculnte firm munications) and the entire financial services sector because
level deflators for output that capture the value of intan- of potential measurement error in inputs (for telecommuni-
gibles, but that would be tantamount to assuming away the cations) and output. The exclusion of these firms reduced
measurement problem. On balance, in the absence of our effective sample to 1,110 overall. Furthermore, it is
reliable industry-level measures of the intangible aspects of likely that measurement issues are particularly troublesome
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in the service sector, and therefore the analysis will focus As reported in column 1 0f Table 4, our estimate of 3 ,
primarily on the manufacturing sector. Other than the indicates that computer capital is correlated with a statisti-
specific cases discussed above, all samples with complete cally significant increase in output in the manufacturing
data for all variables were included in the regression sector. Specifically, we estimate that a 1% increase in
analyses. spending on computer capital is associated with a 0.00518%
increase in output, when all the other factors are held
While the dataset is imperfect, we believe it to be no worse constant. Because computer capital accounted for an
overall, and in some respects superior to, the data used in average of less than 1% of the value of output each year,
previous studies of IT and productivity. this implies an ROI (increase in dollar output per dollar
invested) for computer capital of approximately 54.2% per
year, holding other inputs constant.
1 RESULTS
For the full sample which also included non-manufacturing
To make maximum use of the available data, while de- firms, the output elasticity of computer capital was esti-
riving unbiased and robust estimates, we analyzed the data mated at 0.00610, implying an average ROI of 68.7%,
as a system of simultaneous equations and used the appro- although the estimate was less precise. The estimates for
priate regression techniques. In addition, we examined a the output elasticity for IS labor were 0.0146 in manufac-
number of subsamples of the data and considered specifica- turing and 0.0274 in the full sample, which indicates that
tions that allowed the parameters to vary across time each dollar spent here is correlated with an increase output
periods and industries. In each case, we found that com- of over two dollars.
puter capital and IS labor were positively and significantly
Because not all types of computer capital were included inassociated with increased output
our data and we did not have data on overhead costs, the
estimates for the output elasticity of computer capital and
3.1 Basic Results IS labor may be too high. We analyze the robustness of
the regression to such data omissions in section 3.4 and
We organized the data into five distinct estimating equa-
find that the basic results hold under reasonable assump-
tions. Our confidence in the regression taken as a whole istions as follows, one for each year:
further increased by the fact that the estimated output
elasticities for the other factors of production appeared to
be sensible. For instance, non-computer capital had esti-
Log (1,7  0 + pl Log C*&7 +  2 Log Ki&7 mated returns of 4.14% in manufacturing (and 6.86%
+ 133 Log St,87 + [34 Log 437 + 1 (4a) overall). Furthermore, the elasticities summed to just over
one, implying constant or slightly increasing returns toLog Qi.88 Bo + 13, Log Ci&8 + 132 Log Ki,8 scale overall, which is consistent with the estimates of
+ #3 Log Si,88 + #4 Log I ,88 + 9 (4b) aggregate production functions by other researchers (Berlidl
1991). The R2 hovered around 99%, suggesting that our
Log (hm Bo + A Log Cu9 + B2 Log Kim independent variables could "explain" most of the variance
+ #3 Log Sug + | 4 Log 4,9 + I (4c) in output
Log (190  0 +  t Log Ci,90 + P2 Log Ki,90
+ B Log Si,90 + #4 Log Li,90 + E (4d) 3.2 Using Instrumental Variables to Control
for the Direction of Causality
Log (1,9, Bo + A Log Ci.91 + P2 Log Ki,1
+ & Log Si.91 +  4 Log I-1,91 + E (4e) When estimating production functions, one danger is that
the causality may be reversed: instead of increases in
purchases of inputs (e.g., computers) leading to increases in
Although, in principle, each of these equations can be output, it may be that increases in output lead the firm to
estimated separately, by estimating them simultaneously increase levels of investment. If this is the case, the
using the technique of Iterated Seemingly Unrelated Re- assumptions necessary for ISUR to be unbiased are vio-
gressions (ISUR), it is possible to get more efficient esti- lated. In particular, if spending on computer capital is
mates. We chose the ISUR procedure since it can directly procyclical - it increases more than other inputs during
address serial correlation in the data,7 can properly handle upturns and decreases more during downturns - then the
missing observations, and allows the use of cross-equation estimate of  , will be biased upward, and conversely Bt
constraints to increase the precision of the estimates. will tend to be underestimated if computer capital spending
is countercyclical.
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Table 4. ISUR/3SLS Regressions - Parameters  1'  32'  3'  4 and Sector Dummes
Constrained to be Equal Across Years
Manufacturing &
Manufacturing Services' 1
ISUR 3SLS ISIJR 3SLS
0 1 (Computer Capital) .00518** .00634* .00610** .00516
(2.08) (1.64) (2.12) (1.09)
F2 (Non-Computer Capital) .0286*** .0226*** .0462** .0234***
(6.26) (3.53) (10.7) (3.86)
#3 (Is Labor) .0146***
.0145*** .0274*** .0235***
(3.57) (2.61) (6.32) (3.67)
0 (Non-IS Labor and Expense) .945*** .962*** .095*** .947***4 (132.4) (99.4) (143.5) (99.2)
Dummy Variables; Industry & Year Industry & Year Sector & Year Sector & Year
R' (1991) 99.3% 99.6% 98.6% 98.7%
N (1991) 202 171 272 222
N (total) 788 4892 1055 6392
Key: *** =p< .01; ** =p< .05; * =p< .1; t=p< .2(two-tailed); ratio of coefficient estimate to asymptotic standard
error in pat·enthesis (analogous to t-statistics)
1 Excludes SIC48 and Finance. Including them yields:
4, = 0.0125*** (t = 3.61)
 = 0.0488*** (t = 9.99)
 3 - 0.0345*** (t = 6.84)
#, = 0.0893*** (t = 118.6)
N= 1164
2 N (total) value of 3SLS is lower because each observation requires data for the current period and the previous period;
this eliminates observations for all of 1987 and some in the other years.
3 %2-tests reject the hypothesis that all sector/industry dummy variables simultaneously zero at p < .01. %2-tests on the
year dummies reject the hypothesis that year dummies are each individually equal to zero at p< .01.
Fortunately, regardless of the direction of the potential bias, 62.2% for manufacturing and 54.8% for the full sample.
it is possible to correct for it by using the technique of The estimates for IS labor are also comparable to those in
three stage least squares (3SLS) using instrumental vari- the previous specification.
ables which are designed to filter out any endogenous
variation in the independent variables: We used once-
lagged values of the independent variables as instruments, 33 Examining Potential Differences Over Time
since by definition, they could not be affected by unantici- and in Different Sectors
pated shocks in the dependent variable in the following
year. The results using this technique are reported in Table The estimates described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 were all
4, columns 2 and 4. The return on computer capital is based on the assumption that the parameters did not vary
approximately ihe same as for the ISUR regressions: over time or in different sectors. Therefore, they should be
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Table 5. ISUR and 3SLS Estimates Unconstrained by Year
Manufacturing &
Manufacturing Services'
CSUR) (ISUR)
131,91 (Computer Capital)
.00510 .00198
(1.115) (0.03)
#1,90 (Computer Capital) .0048lt .00704
(1.43) (1.35)
 1,89 (Computer Capital) .00612t
.00702
(1.50) (1.40)
131,88 (Computer Capital)
.00244 .00811
(0.45) (1.54)
 1,87 (Computer Capital)
.00907 .00694
(0.87) (1.06)
02 (Non-Computer Capital) .0323*** .0461***
(7.43) (10.7)
#391 (IS Labor) .0163*** .0358***0.75) (5.14)
 (IS Labor) .0163*** .0301***3,90 (3.31) (4.64)
0 (IS Labor) .0142** .248***3,89 (2.81) (4.20)
 (IS Labor) .0413*** .0261***3,88 (2.12) (4.20)
 3,87 (IS Labor)
.0048 .0211***
(0.46) (2.81)
114(Other Expense) .944*** .906***
(132.0) (143.2)
Dummy Variables2 industry & year sector & year
R2 (1991) 99.3% 99.83%
N (1991) 202 280
N (total) 788 1110
Key: ***=p<.01; **=p<.05; *=p<.1; t=p< .2 (two-tailed); ratio of coefficient estimate to asymptotic standard
error in parenthesis (analogous to t-statistics)
1 Excluding SIC48
2 %2-tests reject the hypothesis that all sector/industry dummy variables simultaneously zero at p< .01. %2-tests on the
year dummies reject the hypothesis that year dummies are each individually equal to zero at p < .01.
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Figure 3. Computer Capital ROI by Sector and Over Time
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interpreted only as overall averages. By using the simulta- When the output elasticity of computer capital was allowed
neous equations approach, it is also possible to allow the to vary across sectors, the estimates were positive for five
parameters to vary by year or sector in the full sample. of the sectors but negative for mining. However, because
The estimates of the unconstrained equations are presented of high standard errors in the unconstrained specifications,
in Table 5 and are shown graphically in Figure 3. we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that the ROI
on computer capital was significantly different from ROI
The estimates for both computer capital and IS labor for for other capital in any sector except for durable manufac-
different years are fairly consistent with one another, turing (see Table 6)."
although there is some evidence that they are increasing
slightly between 1988 and 1991.' In 1991, the return on
investment in computer capital is estimated to be 41% in 3.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Possible Biases
our sample of manufacturing industries, while each dollar
spent on IS labor is correlated with increased revenues of Our estimates of the return to computer capital may be
$2.38. overstated since, as discussed in section 2.3, the amount of
Table 6. ISUR Estimates IT Coefficients Uncontrained by Sector2
Manufacturing & Manufacturing &
Services' Services'
(Computer Capital) .0107*** 131 (Computer Capital) .00653**1MD (2.54) (2.02)
(Computer Capital) .00299 #2 (Non-IS Capital) .0476***1,MN (0.61) (10.11)
 1,SR (Computer Capital)
.0225 13 (IS Labor) .0273***
3MD(1.00) (4.62)
(Computer Capital) .0055t  as Labor) .0316***1,TR 3MN(1.72) (4.83)
 1,MI (Computer Capital) 3,SR-.0093 13 (IS Labor) .0853***(0.53) (3.25)
P _.(Computer Capital) 3,TR.0071 0 (IS Labor) .0302***(0.75) (2.23)
132 (Non-IS Capital) .0494*** 133,MI (IS Labor) .0093(10.5) (0.51)
 33 (IS Labor) 3,TU.0293*** (IS Labor) .0179t
(5.96) (1.61)
04 (Non-IS Labor and Expenses) 4
.902*** 13 (Non-IS Labor and Expenses) .904
(128.4) (128.4)
R (1991) 98.6% R2 (1991) 98.6%
N (1991) 272 N (1991) 272
N (total) 925 N (total) 925
Key: ***=p< .01; **=p<.05; * =p< .1; t=p< .2 (two-tailed); ratio of coefficient estimate to asymptotic standard
error in parenthesis (analogous to t-statistics)
1 Excluding SIC48
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computer capital is likely to be understated. The actual On balance, we may have underestimated both IS input and
effect on the estimate is dependent on how closely cor- final output. The directions of the resulting biases go in
related the excluded computer capital is to our measured opposite directions but under reasonable assumptions they
computer capital. If they are uncorrelated, our estimate for do not appear to obviate the basic finding that the return on
the return to computer capital is unbiased (although there IS capital and labor spending is statistically significant and
may be a small effect on other capital or other expense that exceeds that of other types of capital and labor.
would receive the effect of the excluded computer capital).
If the excluded items (mainly PCs and departmental
4. CONCLUSIONminicomputers) are complementary to our measured com-
puter capital (positive correlation), our estimate would be
high for the return to computer capital. For instance, if
4.1 Summary of Findings
actual computer capital were twice as large as our observed We examined data which included over 1,000 observations
value for computer capital, and if the excluded items are
on output and several inputs at the firm level for the periodperfectly correlated with our measured computer capital, 1987-1991. The firms in our sample were primarily en-
then the our ROI estimate of 54.2% should be revised to gaged in manufacturing and had aggregate sales of about
27.1%. Similarly, our calculated values for the return to IS two trillion dollars in 1991. We tested a broad variety of
labor may be overestimates because we could not include specifications and examined several different subsamples of
corporate overhead and other IS expenses that are likely to the data.
increase proportionately with measured IS labor."
The data indicate that computer capital and IS labor spend-
However, regardless of whether our computer capital and ing contribute significantly to firm level output (summaries
labor estimates are overestimated or underestimated, our of ROI are presented in Table 7 and Figure 3). Further-
result that the returns to computer capital and labor are more, as reported in Table 8, for several specifications we
positive (and statistically significant) holds. were able to reject the hypothesis that the ROI for com-
puter capital was equal to the ROI for non-computer capital
As discussed in sections 1.2 and 2.3, the output price in favor of the hypothesis that the ROI for computer capital
deflators we used may fail to pmperly account for variety was higher. In almost every specification, we could con-
and quality change, which leads to an understatement of clude that the return from spending on IS labor was higher
output. This would bias the estimated IT coefficients than the return from spending on non-IS labor and ex-
downward in our estimates if firms have invested in IT to penses. The basic result that computer capital and labor
improve variety or quality. Even using firm-level data contribute significantly to total output are robust to reason-
underestimates will result to the extent that firms simulm- able assumptions about measurement error due to exclusion
neously invest in IT. In such cases, although the "bar has of unmeasured factors.
been raised," no individual firm gains a competitive advan-
tage. Furthermore, the counterfactual - firms that di(In't
invest and lost sales or went out of business - would not 4.2 Comparison with Earlier Research
exist in the data. The value of variety and quality to
consumers, although real, would therefore appear in neither Several other studies have failed to find evidence that IT
of the two places we looked: the industry deflators and the increases output. Because the models we used were similar
relative changes in firm revenues. to those used by several previous researchers, and follow in
a long tradition of estimating production functions, we
As an additional check of the mbustness of our results we attribute our different findings primarily to the larger and
plotted the regression residuals from the pooled cross- more recent data set we used. Specifically, there are at
sectional analysis and found that they roughly correspond to least three reasons why our results may differ from pre-
a normal distribution. We also checked for heteroskedasti- ViOUS results.
city by comparing White (heteroskedasticity-consistent)
standard errors to the regular standard error estimates and First, we examined a later time period (1987-1991) than did
found little change for pooled, single equation regressions. Loveman (1978-1982), Barua, Kriebel and Mukhopadhyay
Finally, we computed the correlation coefficients to check (1978-1982), or Berndt and Morrison (1968 -1986). The
for collinearity between regressors which could lead to massive build up of computer capital is a relatively recent
higher estimates of the standard errors. All correlations phenomenon. Indeed, the delivered amount of computer
were less than.8 suggesting that collinearity, while present power in the companies in our sample is likely to be atleast an order of magnitude greater than that in comparableis not excessive.
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Table 7. Return on Investment for Computer Capital - Analysis Summary
Point estimtes and 95% (one-tailed) confidence intervals
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
Only Only & Services & Services
Analysis ISUR 3SLS ISUR 3SLS
Simultaneous 54.2% 62.2% 68.7% 54.8%
Equations *42.9% f62.3% *53.3% *82.7
By Year - 91 40.8% 106.3% 16.8% 42.0%
f58.4% *137.6% f787.5% f230.3%
By Year - 90 46.4% 59.8% 75.5% 62.4%
153.4% f77.5% *92.0% *1141.4%
By Year - 89 77.8% 23.9% 94.1% -57.5%
*85.3% f87.2% *110.6% f145.4%
By Year - 88 30.1% -43.8% 106.3% -177.5%
*110.1% *171.7% fl 13.5% *273.0%
By Year - 87 109.9% 87.3%
*207.9% *135.5%
By Sector - MI 86.3%
*55.9%
By Sector - MN 42.5%
*114.5%
By Sector - SR 114.2%
*187.9%
By Sector - TR 98.2%
*93.9%
By Sector - MI -211.8%
1657.5%
By Sector - TU 71.05%
*185.5%
firms from the period studied by the other authors. Bryn- reinvent the office" (Thurow 1990). A pattern of increas-
jolfsson (1993) calculates that even if the ROI of IT were ing returns is also consistent with the strategy for optimal
twice that of non-IT capital, its impact on output in the investment in the presence of learning-by-doing: short-term
1970s or early 1980s would not have been large enough to returns should initially be lower than returns for other
be detected by conventional estimation procedures. Fur- capital, but subsequently rise to exceed the returns to other
thermore, the changes in business processes needed to capital, compensating for the "investment" in learning
realize the benefits of IT may have taken some time to (Lester and McCabe 1993). Under this interpretation, our
implement, so it is possible that the actual returns from high estimates of computer ROI indicate that businesses are
investments in computers have increased over time. In reaping the rewards from the experimentation and learning
particular, computers may have initially created organiza- phase in the early 1980s. Even within our sample, we find
tional slack which was only recently eliminated, perhaps some evidence that returns are higher for later years whenhastened by the increased attention engendered by earlier we allow the parameter on computer capital to vary overstudies that indicated a potential productivity shortfall and
time.suggestions that "to computerize the office, you have to
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Table 8. %2 Testst for Return Differences Between Computer Capital and Other Capitall
Return Difference Tests
Manufacturing
Specification Manufacturing and Services
IT Capital Other Capital IT Capital Other C'.apital
ISUR 54.2%* 4.1% 68.7% 6.9%
3SLS 62.2%t 3.3% 54.8% 3.5%
Key: ***=p<.01; **=p<.05; *=p<.1; t=p< .2
1 %2 tests used since F-tests are not valid for hypothesis testing when non-linear estimation procedures 9ISUR, 3SLS) are
employed. For our sample, %2 and F-test statistics would be approximately equal as a result of the large sample size.
2 A significant result indicates that the return on computer capital is greater than the return for other capital.
Second, we were able to use different and more detailed 4.3 Managerial Implications and
firm-level data than had been available before. The effects Extensions to the Study
of computers in increasing variety, quality or other intangi-
bles is more likely to be detected in firm level data than in If the spending on computers is correlated with significantly
the aggregate data. Unfortunately, all such data, including higher returns than spending on other types of capital, it
ours, is likely to include data errors. It is possible that the does not necessarily follow that companies should increase
data errors in our sample happened to be more favorable spending on computers. The methods employed in our
(or less unfavorable) to computers than those in other study can and do indicate correlations between computer
samples. We attempted to minimize the influence of data spending and output, but cannot prove causality, The fums
errors by cross-checking with other data sources, eli- with high returns and high levels of computer investment
minating outliers, and examining the robustness of the may differ. systematically from the low performers in ways
results to different subsamples and specifications. In that can not be rectified simply by increasing spending.
addition, the large size of our sample should, by the law of For instance, recent economic theory has suggested that
large numbers, mitigate the influence of random distur- "modern manufacturing," involving high intensity of
bances. Indeed, the precision of our estimates was generally computer usage, may require a radical change in organiza-
much higher than those of previous studies; the statistical tion (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). This possibility is
significance of our estimates owes as much to the tighter emphasized in numerous management books and articles
confidence bounds as to higher point estimates. (see, e.g., Malone and Rockart 1991; Scott Morton 1991)
and supported in our discussions with managers, both at
Third, our sample consisted entirely of relatively large their firms and during a recent MIT workshop12 on IT and
"Fortune 500" firms. It is possible that the high IS Productivity we helped organize for approximately thirty
contribution we find is limited to these larger firms. industry representatives.
However, when we disaggregated the data into three groups
by size, the smaller firms in our sample used IS just as There are a number of other directions this work could be
effectively as the larger firms. In fact, an earlier study extended. Although our approach allowed us to infer the
(Brynjolfsson et al. 1991) found evidence that smaller firms value created by intangibles such as product variety by
may benefit disproportionately from investments in infor- looking at changes in the revenues at the firm level, more
mation technology. In any event, because firms in the direct approaches might also be promising. For instance,
sample accounted for such a large share of the total US other variables can be collected to see whether computer
output, the economic relevance of our findings is not productivity is systematically related to characteristics such
heavily dependent on extrapolation of the results to firms as variety of product line, or the average defect rate in their
outside of tile sample. output. It would also be interesting to explore more care-
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fully the roles of environmental variables such as the extent Brynjolfsson, E.; Malone, T.; Gurbaxani, V.; and Kambil,
of foreign and domestic competition. Furthermore, our data A. "Does Information Technology Lead to Smaller
set already includes a number of variables that can further Firms?" Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan
disaggregate the components of IT spending, including the School of Management - Center Coordination Science
number of PCs and the amount spent on training. As Technical Report #123, September 1991.
shown by Weill (1992), different types of IT can have
very different productivities. An attempt to replicate his Bureau of Economic Analysis. Fixed Reproducible Tangi-
findings and the findings of others using our new dataset ble Wealth in the United States, 1925-85. Washington, DC:
could also help to build a cumulative tradition of research US. Government Printing Office, 1987.
in this area.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Gross Output and Related
Series by Industry. (BEA-54, 1977-1989) Washington,
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8. ENDNOTES different except for higher standard errors.
7. We could not use more traditional methods of model-1. An observation is one year of data on all variables for
ing serial correlation in panel data sets due to the shorta specific firm. We did not have all five years of data
time dimension and missing datafor every firm, but the data set does include at least
one year of data for 380 different firms.
8. This is also an appropriate correction for potential
measurement error in one or more of the independent2. The precise definition of "IT" varies from study to variables (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991, p. 160-161).study. Morrison and Berndt included scientific instru-
ments, communications equipment, photocopiers and
other office equipment as well as computers in their 9. This could be interpreted as evidence of growth in
multifactor productivity over this period. We alsodefinition. Others define IT even more broadly, in-
examined regressions for each year individually.cluding software, services and related peripheral equip-
Except for higher standard errors, they are not qualita-ment. As described in section 2.3, the definition used
tively different from the estimates using systems ofin our study is fairly narrow and includes separate
equations, as reported in the paper.estimates for the effect of corporate computer capital
and corporate IS labor.
10. These hypothesis tests were done using %2 tests al the
90% level of significance, Note that in each case, the3. Specifically, the "management productivity of informa- null hypothesis is that return to computers or to IStion technology" (MPIT) dataset, which surveyed sixty
labor is the same as that for non-IT capital and labor,business units of twenty participating firms for the
period 1978-1982. respectively. Thus, when we fail to reject the null
hypothesis, it should be interpreted as neither praise
nor censure for IS, because failing to reject the null
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may simply be the result of a hypothesis test with low 12. The MIT Center for Coordination Science and Interna-
power. tional Financial Services Research Center jointly
sponsored a Workshop on IT and Productivity which
11. In addition, an analogous argument could be made for was held at MIT in December, 1992.
other unmeasured factors, such as R&D capital, which
might be correlated with IS spending; the contribution
of these unmeasured factors might erroneously increase
the IS estimates if the correlation were positive or
decrease it if it were negative.
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